Cyberspace Mimic Defense (CMD) is a proactive defense theory proposed in recent years to deal with vulnerability and backdoor threats that are common in information systems. Different from moving target defense (MTD), CMD can obtain foundation by verifying multiple results from isolated, heterogeneous, and parallel running spaces, thus initiating a more targeted defensive action, such as scheduling and structure transformation. However, scheduling sequence control is a severe problem in this process, which needs to select a series of scheduling time and take into account security, efficiency, and robustness for variable attack situations. Inspired by the traffic and congestion control mechanism in computer networks, this paper proposed a sliding window-based scheduling sequence control method. By setting driver events to trigger the window ''sliding,'' the control parameters update and adapt to the current state accordingly. Then, considering internal resource constraints and external attack situations, a two-factor driver on variable period and exception threshold with their corresponding calculations are specified. Evaluations show that this method can maintain good performance under different scenarios, which proves to be an effective solution for scheduling sequence control in CMD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, proactive defense is a research hotspot in the field of cyberspace security. Aiming at the ubiquitous ''gene defects'' of information systems whose architecture is static, deterministic, and homogeneous, proactive defense methods hope to deploy and operate them in a dynamic, random and diverse manner, thus building trustworthy cyberspace [1] . Moving target defense (MTD) is a representative proactive defense method [2] . It attempts to present uncertain changes in key characteristics of systems and to build a controllable environment for defenders, reducing the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities to attack [3] . However, it is difficult to choose an effective strategy to meet the challenge of coverage, timeliness, and unpredictability in the target ''moving [4] .'' As some countermeasures were proposed [5] , [6] , the problems of blindness, inefficiency and unverifiability of MTD have emerged gradually.
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Inspired by the protective effect of mimic phenomena in the natural world, Cyberspace Mimic Defense (CMD) [7] presents another theoretical method of proactive defense. Different from MTD, CMD proposes to verify the multiple running results of isolated parallel space in comparison, to perceive attack behaviors and infected targets, so that it can hinder an intrusion consciously. As an implementation of CMD in Fig. 1 , the structure of dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) [8] uses an online set O as the running space, where the executors E 1 , E 2 , E 3 are functional equivalent in service (such as web applications or network protocols) but heterogeneous in component (diversified software, operating system, hardware platform, and others). Because of the heterogeneity, vulnerabilities and backdoors existed in each executor have a significant difference; for instance, there are few common vulnerabilities between Windows and Linux exposed in CVE library. Therefore, a standard request for system service will produce consistent messages, while a malicious request will produce inconsistencies due to the effectiveness differences in exploited vulnerability. As the VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ red lines in the figure indicates, although the attack sequence based on vulnerability x could affect E 3 , E 1 and E 2 will ignore it and produce inconsistent messages with E 3 . When the multiple results arrive the output agent, it will trigger the arbitration exception and be perceived by the system. From the view of attackers, if affected executors are the minority in arbitration exception, the response to attack message will not return from the structure, which disturbs the following attack interactions. Only through continuous attempts compromise the majority of online executors, can attackers achieve effective interactions, to steal information, tamper data, even hijack the system. In this process, which is called a trial-anderror process, the system is similar to a black box that the internal state is unknowable for attackers. Moreover, before all the executors in O are compromised, the attack sequence is always triggering arbitration exceptions; that is, the attack behavior can always be perceived. The dynamic property of the DHR structure brings another challenge for attackers. When the scheduler receives exception feedback, it will transform the online executor set (also known as scheduling), replacing and processing the executors that appear abnormal in arbitration (such as E 3 ). This action could abort the harvest of early attacks, making the attacker have to restart the trial-and-error process. From the perspective of information theory, the DHR structure remains uncertain and keep an entropy. The higher the entropy of the structure is, the more difficult it is for attackers to achieve the trial-and-error process. In general, through the working flow above, the DHR structure can protect operational services from any attacks based on vulnerabilities or backdoors. At present, the theory has been studied and applied in SDN [9] - [11] , Web [12] , encryption system [13] , cloud [14] and other fields [15] - [17] , having verified the effectiveness of its security mechanism. The closed-loop process comprised of the exception feedback and the scheduling is a core mechanism in the DHR structure. An ideal scheduling method can accurately locate abnormal executors according to feedback and timely disable them, making intrusion hard to achieve. It produces an excellent security gain for CMD systems, hence becoming a focus in recent research. In [10] , scheduling is modeled as an optimization problem and a heuristic algorithm is proposed to maximize security gain obtained by transformations. Further, in [15] , the security gain is defined as heterogeneity between executors, which is expected to be maximum in the scheduling method. Liu et al. [18] give a scheduling method based on the minimum similarity of random seeds, in which they consider dynamicity and reliability for the DHR structure. Firstly, an executor is selected randomly. Then other executors are determined according to the minimum similarity of them. In real systems, the feedback is considered and analyzed in the design of the mimic web server [12] . However, there is no specification for the setting of scheduling parameters in the article. Some researches [9] , [11] mention that the scheduling could be triggered in exception feedback or period depending on different scenarios. However, they still do not point out how to select the mode and value for the control of trigger. Based on information entropy, Hu et al. [16] put forward a method that makes the scheduling results with maximum uncertainty, and analyze the effect of different intervals on defensive performance in periodic scheduling.
The critical points of the scheduling process are mainly in two aspects: target and timing. The first issue is about how to select an appropriate set of executors for transformation, which has got enough attention in the current research. The second is about how to take an appropriate timing for transformation. There is no other discussion on this problem except for the periodic mode and the trigger of fixed exceptions. However, in the field of proactive defense, timing is a significant issue, which involves security and efficiency in the attack-defense interaction model [19] . Just like the challenge of one-time pad implementation in cryptography, the proactive defense also cannot ignore the constraints of resource and overhead in system changing [20] . In the research of MTD, hopping mechanisms are discussed in fixed [21] and variable period [22] , where the importance of timing strategy is expounded adequately. Moreover, Lei et al. [23] convert the period selection strategy to a nonlinear programming problem, and give an algorithm that simplifies the complexity in computation. In the study of dynamic SDN mapping, Lu et al. [24] try to initiate a changing before the attack has effectively launched, instead of random and periodic modes to reduce defensive overhead. To sum up, the timing of proactive strategy will affect security and efficiency for the defensive mechanism in MTD. While in CMD, the problem of scheduling timing seems to be more critical. As mentioned above, besides making the online set transformation, scheduling brings a series of related processing tasks for disabled executors, which supports the DHR structure to restore itself from an abnormal operating state. Therefore, the scheduling timing is not only relevant to security and efficiency but also has an impact on the robustness, which is significant in the research.
This paper focuses on the timing of scheduling in CMD. The main contributions are as follows:
• A model for scheduling sequence control is established.
We analyze the shortcomings of existing scheduling methods based on this model and put forward some improvement ideas. After that, a threat model for the DHR structure with related evaluation metrics we focus on is given.
• A method for scheduling sequence control based on sliding window is proposed, together with an algorithm for crucial parameters updating, to improve the adaptability of DHR structure in different attack situations and resource states.
• A simulation environment for evaluating the scheduling method of CMD systems is implemented. The simulator has good applicability, which can cover a variety of application scenarios by setting appropriate parameters. It provides a theoretical analysis tool for revealing the rules of the DHR scheduling mechanism, which improves the implementation for real application systems. Section 2 describes and analyzes the problems of scheduling sequence control in the DHR structure, and a threat model combined with evaluation metrics in this paper is defined. In section 3, a sliding window-based control method is proposed, with the corresponding parameter updating algorithm. Section 4 evaluates the proposed method under various scenarios. Finally, we summarize our work in Section 5.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS A. SCHEDULING SEQUENCE CONTROL IN CMD 1) BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLE
As shown in Fig. 2 , the feedback point is the time when an exception is perceived and reported by the arbitration feedback module. After receiving exceptions, the scheduler replaces the executors in the online set with a certain algorithm and control logic to hinder the attack process. Thus, the time at which the scheduler initiates the transformation is a scheduling point. The main tasks of scheduling include disabling and processing the abnormal online executors, selecting and enabling new executors from the standby set, which is to keep the security and integrity of the system. The disabled executors that have been already accomplished for related processing reinclude into the standby set for later use. On timeline, timing of single scheduling can be seen as a point. When we consider and control a series of points in a span of time, it is the problem of scheduling sequence control that this paper focuses on. We describe the definitions in the scheduling model as follows, and the related notation is in Table 1 . 
a: FEEDBACK SEQUENCE
Feedback sequence is the sequence formed by exception feedback point. Let r n denotes the time of the nth feedback point then the feedback sequence is denoted as (r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ) and abbreviated with (r n ).
b: SCHEDULING SEQUENCE
Scheduling sequence is the series of scheduling point. Let d m denote the mth scheduling point, then the scheduling sequence is denoted as (d 1 , d 2 , · · · , d m ) and abbreviated with (d m ).
In the DHR structure, the scheduler handles exception feedback based on internal algorithms and control logic. For trigger conditions of scheduling, we discuss two factors in combination with the existing method: exception threshold S and scheduling period T . In exception-trigger mode, when the number of feedback points exceeds a certain value that is denoted as S, scheduling will perform to break the attack chain. In the time-trigger mode, scheduling initiates every time a fixed interval elapses, and the period is the T .
It is worth noting that the existing CMD research papers rarely consider time overhead and resource limitations in the scheduling model of the DHR structure. However, in a real scenario, scheduling incurs extra time overhead. For instance, the disabled executor must take a certain amount of time to recover to an available state. Besides, the types and quantities of heterogeneous executor in a CMD system are also limited. As a result, in the study of scheduling methods, the arbitrary transformation should not be permitted neglecting its necessary constraints. Therefore, we make the following definitions: c: SCHEDULING OVERHEAD Scheduling overhead is the total time required for scheduling related processing, which is also the rated time for an executor to revert to the available state from its disabling, denoted as to. VOLUME 8, 2020 If E i is in the processing at the moment t, the remaining time of recovery is tor t i .
d: TOTAL HETEROGENEOUS RESOURCE
Total heterogeneous resource is the number of executors in , which is denoted as C and C = | |.
e: AVAILABLE SCHEDULING CAPACITY
The standby set at the moment t is denoted as B t , the number of executors in it is the available scheduling capacity c t and c t = |B t |.
Except for the executors in the standby set, if the number of executors in online set O at t is l t and in scheduling processing state is h t , we have l t + h t + c t = C.
2) MOTIVATIONS
The problem of the scheduling sequence control in CMD can simplify as a discussion for the setting of period and exception threshold, under the constraint of scheduling overhead and available scheduling capacity. In this way, the resulting scheduling sequence should meet the needs of security, efficiency, and robustness as much as possible.
For the periodic mode (i.e. fix time-trigger), it is obvious that a stable scheduling sequence is easy to obtain according to the scheduling overhead. However, the problem is that the mode does not utilize the exception feedback from arbitration, so the perceived attack process cannot be hindered consciously. If the attacker can sniff out the T , it can initiate targeted intrusion by deliberately avoiding the scheduling point, as shown in Fig. 3 (a). Additionally, in Figure 3 (b), once a period T is adopted, no matter what kind of attack situation the system is in, it initiates scheduling at a fixed interval. This stereotyped way will cause lots of unnecessary extra overhead when the attack behavior is sparse. However, when the attack behavior becomes intensive, it cannot reduce security threats through adaptive adjustments.
For the exception-trigger mode, the scheduler can perceive and pre-estimate the attack behavior according to feedback information to take a targeted hindering. As a result, the DHR structure is of high security. However, a new tough problem emerges that the setting of exception threshold is hard to determine fixedly, which is affecting the security and robustness of the DHR structure. As shown in Fig. 4 , when S becomes smaller, the trigger condition is ''tightened.'' It may cause excessive defense: in a short period, if the attacker can frequently trigger arbitration exceptions, the system will fall into a large amount of scheduling, causing the oscillation of sudden increase in overhead. In extreme cases, when the standby executor set cannot be replenished in time, the scheduling mechanism will be inoperative since there is no available executor to enable. Consequently, the system ''degenerates'' to a non-mimic structure, which is known as the degraded state, leading to compromising of security. When S becomes large, the scheduling condition is ''loosened,'' and the system has a certain degree of tolerance for exceptions. Although this can alleviate the problem of excessive defense, it increases the opportunity of trial-anderror for attackers: as long as the number of exceptions caused by intrusion does not reach the S, it can continue to carry on, thus increasing the security risk of systems. In view of the above problems, we give the two ideas for the method design in scheduling sequence control. Firstly, consider the internal resource capabilities and external attack situations for the DHR structure, to introduce the control constraints with exception and time together. Secondly, break the fixed mode in the settings of S and T , and provide an algorithm for adjustment to solve the adaptive problem.
B. THREAT MODEL AND EVALUATION METRICS 1) THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY
In [25] , the network attack process is characterized by an attack graph model, which used to manage and mitigate security risk. Further, the model is applied to assessing the effectiveness of proactive methods [26] and expands to take consideration of dynamic aspects [27] . Besides, the approach uses for the study of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) [28] , which is decomposed into sequential phases to achieve intrusion goal, known as kill chain [29] .
Whether in a network or a specific system, it holds the view that the intrusion process has a causal relationship and can express as a series of interactions (Input n → Output n ). The attacker obtains information and intrusion conditions through the previous results Output i−1 , supporting the following interaction Input i . For the DHR structure, Wu gives two propositions in [8] when discusses the relation between heterogeneous executors and the network attack based on vulnerabilities and backdoors:
Proposition 1 (Relatively Correct Axiom): There are various vulnerabilities and backdoors in heterogeneous executors, but the probability of a common one (its exploited interactions Input i → Output i are identical for the executors composed of different platforms, OSs, operating environments, and other components) is extremely low. Hence, the malicious request based on vulnerabilities and backdoors of a single executor will cause a high probability of inconsistent Output i from different executors.
Proposition 2 (The Randomity of Trial and Error): For a heterogeneous redundancy structure, if the attackers cannot obtain useful information through the Output i−1 to guide the following Input i , they can only continuously try different vulnerabilities or backdoors to cause the majority or even all of executors to enter an abnormal state, hijacking the entire system. If the process has enough time, and the system structure does not change, it is still a de-entropy process, which the uncertainty of the structure gradually decreases with the attempts. However, for the DHR structure, this process can be reset by an ideal scheduling, which restores structural uncertainty through the transformation, so that the attack interaction is approximate to a stochastic event.
Proposition 1 extends from the dissimilar redundancy structure [30] . Its application reduces the failure rate of flight control system to 10 −11 [31] , effectively solving the reliability problem caused by random failure. For the DHR structure, this means that the request of exploiting vulnerabilities and backdoors has a high probability of inconsistent response, which will be perceived by the arbitration mechanism. Therefore, for the scheduler, the exception information (r n ) fed back through the arbitration module happens to be a kind of mapping of the attack interaction (Input n → Output n ), and the number of continuous exception feedback points reflects the progress of the attack process. Combined with Proposition 2, we can give the threat model faced by DHR structure. The following is proposition and proof.
Proposition 3: Under the premise that the Proposition 1, 2 are guaranteed, the number of exception feedback points approximately follows the Poisson distribution X when the trial-and-error process of the DHR structure is successful.
Proof: Assume that an attacker has a universal set ϒ of vulnerabilities and backdoors, which means that it has the ability to launch an attack based on any of them. According to Proposition 2, for the DHR structure, the trial-and-error process needs to try out ϒ one by one, and successively uses multiple vulnerabilities and backdoors to hijack all online executors. Here we cognize the process as follows: the success of a trial-and-error process needs no less than certain times of attack interaction attempts, and this is a boundary for the system to enter high risk. According to Proposition 1, these attempts will trigger a certain number r of arbitration exceptions that feedback to the scheduler, so r is another boundary of risk, which we try to obtain the statistical law in the threat model. Then, exception feedback at the moment t can be regarded as a stochastic event R with a probability of
Among them, the VUL i is the set of vulnerabilities and backdoors in the executor E i . Equation (1) shows that the exception feedback only occurs when an attack attempt exploits the elements in the VUL of online executor. In practice, for online set O t at any time t, the number of elements in ϒ is generally much larger than the number of vulnerabilities and backdoors in O t . As a result, p t (R) → 0. Moreover, the size of the universal set |ϒ| seldom changes during the trial-and-error process. Therefore, we can simplify that the p t is represented as time-independent p, i.e., the probability of exception feedback appearing in attack attempts.
In this way, the problem we concern with can be considered to a pascal distribution problem: the trial-and-error process is a Bernoulli experiment with the probability of p. r is the number of exception feedback points, and k is the number of non-feedback points, then the probability mass function of the random variable X is
Rewrite (2) with p = 1 − k k+λ , and
So, the probability mass function in the limit k → ∞ is
The proof has completed. Then we make the definitions of security metrics as follows:
a: TRIAL-AND-ERROR EXPECTATION By Proposition 3, the number of exception feedback points r generated by finishing k times (when it is large enough) attack interactions with the DHR structure follows a Poisson distribution P(λ), where λ is the trial-and-error expectation of the structure, and
If the arbitration exception triggered by attack attempts exceeds λ, the DHR structure will enter the high-risk state.
b: SYSTEM RISK RATE (SRR)
After attackers successfully finishing the trial-and-error on target DHR structure, the system will not leave the high-risk state until the next effective scheduling occurs. If the total time in this state is t R within a span of time t a , then SRR is revealing the proportion of time when the structure is in risk and defined as
In t a , the number of times which the system enters a high-risk state is denoted as N (R), and the total time in high-risk state is t R , then ARD can be defined as
During the operation of the DHR structure, although the scheduling related processing for disabled executors is a necessary way to improve security, it should be avoided that the excessive reduction in executor serviceability caused by frequent scheduling. In this regard, we give a definition to evaluate the performance of the scheduling method in terms of overhead control.
a: SYSTEM OPERATION EFFICIENCY (SOE)
A DHR structure with C executors. The online service time of executor E i is available from t s (E i ), and the time for it in scheduling related processing is available from t ns (E i ). Then we give the proportion of t s (E i ) to evaluate SOE, and
3) ROBUSTNESS
With the gradual application of CMD theory, attackers with unsuccessful frontal intrusion are likely to divert to exploit the implementation defects of DHR structures instead, and the scheduling will undoubtedly become the focus of attention to attackers. As commented earlier, the excessive defense problem is one of the difficulties that need to be faced in scheduling sequence control. The resulting degraded service will make the CMD system unable to provide the security capability of the original design, which belongs to a robustness problem. For such a case, we define the following metrics:
When the jth scheduling occurs, if the available scheduling capacity c t j = 0, the system enters the degraded state. It is not until c t j > 0 that system state is restored and the scheduling is reimplemented. Degraded sequence G = (g 1 , g 2 , · · · g w , · · · ) is comprised of the sequence number of scheduling that has been degraded, and SDF = |G|.
b: SYSTEM DEGRADATION RATE (SDR)
SDR is the proportion of total degraded time, revealing the length of time that the structure cannot perform normal scheduling function. The degrading and restoring time point of the jth scheduling are respectively recorded as dt j and ut j . For a given t a and G, we have
III. SCHEDULING SEQUENCE CONTROL METHOD BASED ON SLIDING WINDOW
Inspired by the traffic and congestion control methods in computer networks, we introduce the sliding window mechanism to deal with the scheduling sequence control. As we all know, complex network situations bring severe challenges to data transmission. Similarly, randomness, bursty, and variable cyber-attacks will cause adaptive problems in the scheduling of CMD systems. As mentioned in the previous analysis, first, we need to change the fixed threshold and period into a variable way and combine them to constrain the scheduling timing control. Then, the sliding window mechanism is adopted to adaptively update the control parameters by setting the related events and algorithms, which helps the DHR structure to maintain high-grade security, efficiency, and robustness in complex attack situations.
A. DEFINITIONS
The basic idea of the proposed method is shown in Fig. 5 . The scheduler maintains a scheduling window with a twodimensional property of time and size. Time refers to the validity period of the window, and size refers to the exception threshold that the number of exception feedback points can be tolerated during the period. The sliding of the window requires the specific driver events, designed to that window is overdue (driven by time) and exceptions exceed threshold (driven by exception). When sliding, the window updates according to the corresponding algorithms, which change the time and size to adapt attack situations and system resource states. Meanwhile, system scheduling initiates. This process repeats so that the system can continuously adapt to environment changing and generate new windows, supporting flexible scheduling control. According to the description, the definitions are given as follows:
To achieve the flexible control, the window i operates with a variable window validity period t i . If the window opens at t i , then the expected closing time is t i + t i .
2) WINDOW EXCEPTION THRESHOLD
When the number of feedback points exceeds a certain value, the scheduling should be triggered to transform the DHR structure to break the attack chain. This value is the window exception threshold and is recorded as s i for window i.
3) SCHEDULING WINDOW
Scheduling window (or window for simplicity) is the abstraction for timing control, containing two-dimensional attributes of time and size, which can slide and update the attribute values. The window i represents as i, t i , s i .
4) WINDOW DRIVER
Window driver is the event set that drives the window to slide. The driver of the window i is denoted as (i) = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e z } where e represents a specific event. It is a condition that can be judged based on the time and size of a window.
In order to ensure the reasonableness of window parameters, it may be necessary to set the upper and lower limits according to the characteristics of a real application. We record these limits for the validity period as t max and t min , and for the exception threshold as s max and s min .
B. METHOD DESIGN
In this section, we design a scheduling sequence control method based on the sliding window and describe it in three parts: Firstly, introduce the functional modules and interactions. Then, give the settings combined with the calculations of t and s. Finally, complete the algorithm flow.
1) FUNCTIONAL MODULES AND INTERACTIONS
As shown in Fig. 6 , the scheduler (the dotted line included part), the input agent, the output agent, and the functionally equivalent executor set together form the DHR structure. The meaning and function of each module and its sub-modules are as follows:
a: SLIDING WINDOW MODULE
This module is used to implement the sliding window mechanism in scheduling control, providing functions such as event monitoring, scheduling triggering, and parameter updating.
• Monitor and Trigger: The sub-module monitors driver events in real-time based on exception feedback counter and internal timers. Once the conditions reaching, it initiates a window sliding phase and triggers the scheduling module enabled in the meantime.
• Information reading sub-module: This sub-module reads the required information from the storage module for following calculations.
• Threshold calculation sub-module: This sub-module calculates the s for the next window.
• Time calculation sub-module: This sub-module calculates the t for the next window.
b: STORAGE MODULE
This module is used to store the key information required for scheduling control.
• Updating sub-module: The sub-module receives messages from other modules so that updates the exception, scheduling, and window information.
• Exception information: It is the inconsistent information that is fed back by the output agent.
• Window information: It is the history information of windows reported by the sliding window module.
• Scheduling information: It is the history information of scheduling reported by the scheduling module.
c: SCHEDULING MODULE
After receiving an enabling command from the sliding window module, the scheduling module reads the information of exception and scheduling from the storage module, and selects the target from all available executors according to the loaded algorithm, and then control the input agent, the output agent and the executor set to achieve transformation.
2) WINDOW PARAMETERS CALCULATIONS a: WINDOW DRIVER SETTING
Same as the periodic mode for scheduling, the t singlebased driver is beneficial to systems to maintain robustness, but it can only initiate updating at each closing time of the VOLUME 8, 2020
window. Hence, it is impossible to quickly adjust and adapt to the attack situation changes during a window. Contrarily, the s single-based driver ignores the internal resource states of the DHR structure, and hard to converge when s becomes large. It is not conducive to maintain the security and robustness. Therefore, in this paper we combine t i and s i to propose the (i):
The driver event e 1 needs to qualify two decisions: the current time t exceeds the window closing time t i + t i and the available scheduling capacity c t > 0. The other event e 2 needs to meet the condition that the real-time number of exception feedback points ϕ i exceeds the exception threshold s i , and the available scheduling capacity c t > 0.
b: VALIDITY PERIOD CALCULATION
The update of validity period is related to the occurred driver event. If e 1 happens, it indicates that the attack frequency in the previous window is lower than expected. Thus the t can expand in the subsequent control to decrease expected attack rate. On the contrary, if e 2 happens, the t needs to reduce to increase the rate. Set t 1 as the initial value, the formula is
In equation (9), an expansion multiplied coefficient is set in the interval [1, 2] when e 1 happens. If the closer ϕ i−1 to s i−1 in the previous window is, the smaller the deviation of control parameters is, hence the coefficient is closer to 1. Contrarily, the coefficient is close to 2, making t i more expansion to correct the larger deviation. While in the case of e 2 , a smooth way is adopted in t reduction, which calculates the average of the validity period t i−1 and the actual period value d i − d i−1 at threshold reaching.
Furthermore, to balance system security and robustness, we set the upper limit t max and the lower limit t min in equation (10) . Here, to represents the shortest remain time of executors to enter the standby state from scheduling processing. For t max , we set to as a basis to constrain the expansion calculation. Concerning fully utilizing the system resources, it is not expected that the next update time of the window exceeds the time when the standby set replenishes. Besides, we make an adjustment according to the proportion of unavailable executors h i in the offline state h i + c i , for the reason that the system can further strengthen security if the standby executors are sufficient. For t min , we set to in the reduction calculation for robustness. Because the window update time should not lower than the fastest recovery time of disabled executors, to avoid the occurrence of degraded. Meanwhile, the same coefficient uses to adjust this value, for the reason that the system should further strengthen robustness if the standby executors are insufficient.
c: EXCEPTION THRESHOLD CALCULATION
Contrary to the update rule for t, if the driver event is e 1 , the exception threshold s i needs to be reduced in the subsequent control. While an e 2 occurs, it is indicating that the current attack frequency is higher than expected. Thus, it should be expanded in the next window. Set s 1 as the initial value, there is a formula:
In equation (11), we use an adjustment coefficient in the calculation when e 1 occurs and
As shown in Fig. 7 , the coefficient transforms from the sigmoid function, which is monotonically decreasing in (0.5, 1). The closer it is to the upper and lower limits, the smaller the change is. While the farther it is away from the limits, the more significant the change is. The physical meaning is that when the exception threshold of the previous window s i−1 is relatively low, the reduction speed should be slowed down to avoid excessive defense. If s i−1 is above a certain expected value, the reduction should be close to 0.5 as soon as possible, to avoid system high-risk caused by lagging convergence. When e 2 occurs in equation (11), since the t i of the next window has been reduced in equation (9), we calculate s i based on the attack frequency in the previous window. It should be noted that the exception threshold upper limits s max and lower limits s min are not used as constraints in this paper. The reason is that the setting of s max is inevitability subjective, and it is necessary to estimate the number of exceptions generated for attack chains. So far, this is still difficult to achieve. Besides, since the exception threshold is a non-negative integer, so the s min is noticeably greater than or equal to 1. In general, it is not necessary to make an additional setting.
3) ALGORITHM FLOW
Based on the functional module design, the driver setting and the parameter calculations, we give an algorithm flow for scheduling.
The main tasks of Algorithm 1 are the driver monitoring, the scheduling triggering, and the window sliding. After the
Algorithm 1 Monitor and Trigger
Input: (r n ) exists in the form of an exception feedback interrupt Output: the signal of window sliding and scheduling Procedure: //Initialization phase 1. collect structure information l t , C, B, if e 1 = ture or e 2 = ture then 25.
start scheduling phase and window sliding 26. else continue; 27. end if 28. end while initialization is complete, the scheduler begins receiving and processing exception feedback signals and turns on an internal window timer. Once a driver event occurs, the window sliding phase and the scheduling phase are asynchronously enabled. However, if the conditions required for scheduling are not met, these phases are not enabled before a recovery signal is received. During this period, new exception feedback is just counted, and the DHR structure is falling into a degraded service state without scheduling function.
The main task of Algorithm 2 is to update the scheduling control parameters. After receiving a window sliding signal, the scheduler needs to read the parameters required for window update, and then perform corresponding calculations according to the driver event. Finally, when the scheduling completion signal is received, the Algorithm will enable a new window for the next timing of scheduling.
Algorithm 2 Window Sliding Phase
Input: the signal of window sliding and scheduling completion, driver e Output: scheduling window i, t i , s i Procedure:
. calculate t i , s i according to e 5. waiting for the complete signal of scheduling phase, new window i, t i , s i take effect 6. timer ← 0 7. ϕ i ← 0 8. Store window information, call back monitoring phase Algorithm 3 is mainly about calculations of scheduling target and the control for transformation. As it is not the focus in the paper, so will not be discussed here. We analyze the reasonableness of the method in combination with Fig. 8 . For the sake of explanation, it is assumed that there are two external attack situations where the number of feedback points in a period is more or less, namely, strong and weak. Likewise, internal resource conditions can divide into abundance or starvation according to the scheduling overhead, the total heterogeneous resource, and the available scheduling capacity. At start, the attack scenario is weak, so the window drivers are dominated by e 1 , resulting in t expanded and s reduced. In this process, the expansion of t enables system to slow down its scheduling frequency thus improving the operational efficiency. Meanwhile, the reduction of s makes the system more sensitive in handling exception feedback, so as to keep itself secure by fully using internal resources. While in a strong attack situation later, the window drivers are dominated by e 2 , resulting in t reduced, and s is produced by the expansion of exception tolerance within the new t. So, the system robustness problem caused by a large amount of feedback can effectively alleviate. For the reduction of t, one purpose is to speed up convergence of the adaptation process by shortening intervals of window sliding. The second is to alleviate system security risk caused by the exception tolerance. Moreover, owing to limits, t is never higher than t max and lower than t min , thus making up security and robustness loss in update algorithm.
The consideration of internal resources is mainly reflected in the setting of upper and lower limits. In calculations of t max and t min in equation (10), we use the proportion of executors unavailable in the offline state for adjustment. When resources are in short supply, the ratio rises and t min approaches to . The reducing of t is limited not below the fastest completion time in recovery executors, so that there are available standby executors existed when the next window updates, decreasing the probability of system degradation. When resources are ample, the decrease of the ratio makes t max reducing. Window sliding is promoted, thereby fully utilization of heterogeneous resources and improving system security.
2) COMPLEXITY
In order to improve scheduling efficiency, an asynchronous mode is used in the method design to enable scheduling and window sliding. The new window is taking effect after ensuring that the scheduling transformation is complete. Therefore, the time complexity of the window update algorithm should not exceed that of scheduling transformation, so that window parameters have updated before a completion signal of scheduling phase is coming. In the method, the main computational tasks are the updates of t max , t min , t, and s. Among them, the calculation formula of t min needs to find the fastest recovery executor, which has time complexity O(h t ). While the others are always O(1), hence the total time complexity is O(h t ). Further, h t is always less than the total amount of heterogeneous resources C which is not too large in real application, so the time complexity of the algorithm is still constant, and it will not become a time bottleneck in system operation.
For space complexity, the scheduling related sequences are organized in a one-dimensional array, but they primarily store on disk. When we calculate t max and t min using the corresponding algorithm, it will use an array containing the recovery time of executors with the space complexity of O(C). While in the calculations of t and s, the loaded previous data, such as s i−1 , t i−1 , and ϕ i−1 , are in non-array formats. Consequently, the space complexity of them is O (1) . As can be seen from analysis above, C is always a constant order, so the overall space complexity is constant.
IV. EVALUATIONS
This section conducts experiment evaluations, focusing on the following three aspects:
• The necessity of the research: The necessity is to verify the mentioned problems in §II-A-2 and explore other impacts in the process of scheduling sequence control.
• Effectiveness of the method: If the necessity is established, whether the sliding window-based scheduling sequence control method can effectively solve the problem.
• Algorithm performance: We set the corresponding experiment scenarios according to the real applications and compare the metrics of the algorithm proposed in this paper with that of the existing methods. In the paper, a simulator is implemented in Python for evaluations, including the functions of the DHR structure, the threat model, and the compared experiment methods of scheduling sequence control.
A. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 1) SIMPLIFIED SETTINGS
In order to focus on the problems and methods in scheduling sequence control, the simulator simplifies the following elements while ensuring reasonableness:
• Since we do not pay attention to the target selection problem of scheduling in this paper, it is assumed that the scheduling phase can locate and disable abnormal executors, select and enable appropriate executors at the meanwhile. Therefore, in each scheduling phase, the number of executors to enable is set to 1, and the selection mode is random.
• In order to balance resource overhead and security, the currently CMD systems are usually operating with three heterogeneous executors simultaneously, so l t in the experiments is set to a constant value of 3. In terms of time, it is necessary to stipulate a minimum interval of the simulator as a unified unit for event occurrence and processing in the DHR structure. In this paper, we consider the interval of attack interactions, the efficiency of scheduler interrupt processing, and the scheduling overhead. Thus, the time unit is 1 second.
• This paper focuses on the theoretical problems in scheduling sequence control. It has not been tested in real CMD systems. Therefore, the delay in algorithm implementation does not need to be evaluated, and the relevant factors are simplified in the simulator.
2) EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT SETTINGS
In the experiment, we hope to examine and study the performance under varied attack situations and resource conditions. For this reason, the experimental environment parameters are set as follows:
• The length of the experiment: We set 1000 units as the length of one experiment in simulation.
• Exception feedback sequence: Network attack behavior is capricious in the time dimension. Thus, the simulator randomly generates feedback sequences (r n ) as the input of the scheduler.
• Attack strength: We use the proportion of n in the total length to reflect the attack strength of scenarios. In the evaluations, the ratios are 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%, respectively.
• Trial-and-error process: According to Proposition 3, the number r follows a Poisson distribution P(λ). Let the k = 1000, p ≥ 0.994, then λ = 6 is calculated by equation (3). For the first simplified setting above, each time a scheduling is completed, the r will sequentially change from the P(λ) sequence.
• Scheduling overhead: According to the research, the scheduling of CMD Web and DNS consumes 10∼30 seconds, that in the routers are around 60 seconds, and that in metadata nodes of distributed storage is about 90 seconds. Therefore, set to with values of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 units, respectively.
• Total heterogeneous resources: Considering the implementation cost of the DHR structure, the number of online and standby sets is usually in the manner of 3-1 or 3-3, and the number of standby set is generally not more than twice of l t . Therefore, the values of C in the experiment are 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively.
3) EXPERIMENT OBJECTS, METHODS AND METRICS
Considering the existing trigger modes of period and exception, we set the comparison methods as follows:
• Fixed period: In a real application, designers usually set a period according to the system conditions. Here we give two methods of periodic mode, Tight-T and Loose-T following a strict and loose strategy. Their period setting formulas are
Among them, Tight-T sets the period to the smallest integer based on the number of standby executors where the degradation will not occur. Loose-T uses the scheduling overhead as its scheduling period, so that the scheduling performs after the last disabled executor is recovered.
• Fixed threshold: According to the setting of λ in the trial-and-error process, we give the exception threshold setting for Tight-S and Loose-S by the 2/8 analysis method:
As λ = 6, the results of the approximate integer are S Tight ≈ 3, S Loose ≈ 8. For equation (14) , the principle of Tight-S is that the scheduling breaks 80% of the expected successful trial and error, and Loose-S only breaks 20% of them.
• The method proposed in this paper (Sliding Window):
As the method has a self-adaptive ability, we do not care of the setting on its initial values. Set the related control parameters: t 1 = T Tight , s 1 = S Tight . In order to ensure objectivity and reduce the error caused by uncertain factors in the experiment, we use the Monte Carlo method to cycle the environment generation and experiment process 50 times and obtain the results statistically. Besides, the control variable method is used here to conduct a more explicit analysis concerning the performance change and the comparison of scheduling methods under different scenarios. The default values are selected by compromise, including n default = 200, to default = 50, C default = 6.
The values of experiment variables in different scenarios are shown in Table 2 . The results are evaluated using the presented metrics in §II-B.
B. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 1) THE IMPACT OF ATTACK SCENARIOS
The results are shown in Fig. 9(a) . As n increases, the attack strength gradually increases, and the SRR of all methods shows a sharp rise except Loose-S. Among them, the rise of the periodic mode is dramatic. When n is 200, the SRR of Loose-T and Tight-T has exceeded other methods, and reached 0.82 and 0.56 respectively when n is 400. In Fig. 9(b) , the ARD of Loose-T and Tight-T always keeps rising, verifying the statement that ''While the attack behavior becomes intensive, it cannot reduce security threats through adaptive adjustments,'' which is shown in Fig. 3 . For the exceptiontrigger mode, the SRR of Loose-S always keeps in the interval [0.17, 0.25], which is close to 0.2. When n is less than 100, it is much larger than the similar mode Tight-S, which verifies ''it increases the opportunity of trial-and-error for attackers'' as shown in Fig. 4 . It is worth noting that when n exceeds 100, the SSR of Tight-S begins to rise rapidly, and after 300, it exceeds Loose-S, reaching 0.49. In combination with Fig. 9(b) , the ARD of Tight-S changed from 6.82 to 10.49 during this period, which is not apparent, indicating that the number of risk occurrences has dramatically increased. For this, the reason is undoubted that Tight-S has undergone a large amount of system degradation when the attack strength increases, as shown in Fig. 9(e) . As a result, the DHR structure unable to provide a security capability through the scheduling function. In contrast, the Sliding Window always maintains a low SRR and ARD, which is at or near the minimum for different attack strengths. The consistently high security demonstrates its good adaptability.
As can be seen in Fig. 9(c) , the SOE of Loose-T and Tight-T remains unchanged under any attack strengths, which is inefficient when n is less than 50, confirming the statement ''This stereotyped way will cause lots of unnecessary extra overhead when the attack behavior is sparse'' in Fig. 3(b) . Loose-S and Tight-S have higher SOE when n is less than 50, both of which exceed 0.8. However, after n reaches 100, there is no advantage over other methods that the SOE of them begins to decline dramatically. In contrast, the SOE of the Sliding Window is moderate in each n value. It only declines from 0.87 to 0.54 throughout the process, which is 25% smaller than the total drop of Loose-S and Tight-S, reflecting its adaptability to attack scenarios.
In Fig. 9 (d) and 9(e), both SDR and SDF of Loose-T and Tight-T are 0 under any scenarios, which is no degradation occurs. The reason is that when the methods set parameter T , the equation (13) ensures that the period is not lower than the degradation limit. This reveals that ''a stable scheduling sequence is easy to obtain according to the scheduling over-head,'' which is stated in §II-A-2. Loose-S degrades when n is 300 and 400, and its SDR was 0.0001 and 0.02 respectively, which is in sharp contrast with the Tight-S, showing that ''this way (S setting is Loose) can alleviate the problem of excessive defense.'' At low strength where n is less than 100, neither Sliding Window nor Tight-S degrades. However, when n exceeds 100, the SDR and SDF of Tight-S rise rapidly and have reached 0.55 and 50.34 at 400, making the scheduling in the DHR structure mostly inoperative, result in the loss of original security gain. Combined with the SSR change of Tight-S in Fig. 9(a) , it proves that ''the system 'degenerates' to a non-mimic structure, leading to compromising of security'' as shown in Fig. 4 . In contrast, the SDR and SDF of Sliding Window only rise to 0.04 and 8.34, which indicates that the method can effectively alleviate the problem of excessive defense and improve the robustness of the DHR structure through adaptive control for the scheduling sequence.
Since the experiments have verified that the periodic methods can configure control parameters consciously, so as not degrading, thus the robustness metrics of Loose-T and Tight-T are no longer compared for analysis in the subsequent experiments.
2) THE IMPACT OF SCHEDULING OVERHEAD
As the scheduling overhead to increases, the time of scheduling processing for disabled executors increases. As shown in Fig. 10 (a) and 10(b), All algorithms except Loose-S have a rise in both SRR and ARD. Among them, the rise of Loose-T is the most significant, due to the setting increase of T Loose by equation (13) with to. The other Tight-T, Tight-S and Sliding Window perform similarly in ARD, but the SRR of Sliding Window rises more slowly, revealing its much security. When to is 90, the difference between the SRR of Sliding Window and that of Tight-T and Tight-S are −0.19 and −0.2, respectively. Compared with Tight-S, Sliding Window has better security because of better robustness. As can be seen from Fig. 10(e) , the SDF of Tight-S is significantly higher than that of Sliding Window, which proves again that the degradation of systems will induce security problems. However, Tight-T does not cause any degradation, and it has more scheduling times. The advantage of Sliding Window is the high efficiency for each scheduling point, due to the utilizing of exception feedback. It is worth noting that the SRR and ARD of Loose-S in this experiment are not sensitive to the changes in to. Its security is relatively weak in the scenarios of low scheduling overhead, where to is less than 50. When to rises to 90, its security is close to that of the Sliding Window, with only 0.02 difference in SRR. Moreover, its ARD is 12.04, which is the lowest among all methods.
In Fig. 10(c) , with the increase of to, the SOE of whom is using the non-periodic scheduling mode, shows a downward trend. Compared with the methods in the fixed threshold mode, Sliding Window's decay range of SOE is smaller, only from 0.70 to 0.55, while those in Loose-S and Tight-S are from 0.92 to 0.58 and from 0.82 to 0.51, respectively. Perversely, the SOE of the periodic methods Loose-T and Tight-T does not maintain a fixed value, which is inconsistent with the law presented in Fig. 9(c) . For this, the reason is that the T setting in equation (13) is influenced by the increase of to, as shown in Table 2 . Fig. 10 (d) and 10(e) show that for the other three methods except for Loose-T and Tight-T, the increase of to will cause rises in SDR and SDF. Among them, the SDR of Tight-S begins to sharply rise when to exceeds 30, reaching 0.49 when to is 90, and the degradation time is nearly half. Its SDF keeps rising but decreases in the change from 70 to 90, due to the time growth of a single degradation with the to increase. In contrast, the robustness performance of the Sliding Window is close to Loose-S, approaching zero. The difference in SDR and SDF is only 0.04 and 2.96 when to is 90, which is already the maximum in this experiment. This also confirms that the proposed method has good adaptability and provides useful improvement for the robustness of the DHR structure.
3) THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEOUS RESOURCE CAPACITY
As shown in Fig. 11 (a) and 11(b), as C increases, the SRR and ARD of each method show a downward trend. Among them, Loose-T and Loose-S are close to each lower limit when C is 4 and 5 respectively. Their floating range of SRR are [0.62, 0.63] and [0.20, 0.22], and the range of ARD is [31.35, 32.11] and [11.14, 11.73 ]. For the other three algorithms, when C is less than 6, the SSR of the Sliding Window remains the lowest. When C increases to 8, the difference in SRR and ARD between Sliding Window and Tight-S, which is the best one in this scenario, is only 0.03 and 2.42. In short, Sliding Window can maintain excellent performance in terms of security.
As C increases, the SOE of each algorithm generally has a decline due to the time increase of scheduling. As shown in Fig. 11(c) , when C is 4, it is in a starvation state for resources that the only one standby executor is almost in scheduling processing all the time, so the SOE of all methods is close to 0.75. When C begins to increase, Loose-T stays the same SOE as T Loose is constant 50, and Loose-S converges to 0.71 very quickly. For the remaining three methods, Sliding
Window maintains an advantage of performance consistently, the difference reaching 0.08 and 0.18 higher than Tight-S and Tight-T when C is 8. Combined with Fig. 11(a) , the security of Tight-T is the lowest among the three methods, but it consumes more overhead in scheduling overhead. Therefore, it can be seen that the security of the DHR structure is not determined solely by scheduling times. The statement ''For the exception-trigger mode, the scheduler can perceive and pre-estimate the attack behavior according to feedback information to take a targeted hindering'' in §II-A-2, has a practical significance for research on scheduling sequence control.
As shown in Fig. 11(d) and 11(e), when C is 4, there is only one standby executor, and the system is prone to degradation. The SDR of Tight-S is even as high as 0.68, while both Sliding Window and Loose-S are 0.21. As C increases, The SDR and SDF of all methods decline constantly, revealing that the robustness of DHR structure rises gradually. Until C increases to 8, the degradation no longer appears for all methods. In this process, the comparison of the executors required numbers for robustness recovery is
1) NECESSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
In the previous section, we conduct experiments on proposed and four compared methods in different scenarios and analyzed the results, respectively. Here in this part, for a more comprehensive evaluation, we summarize the performance of all experiment results in Table 3 for discussion. In order to outstand the representativeness of result comparison, the scenarios are divided into two relative cases according to their value size of variables. The corresponding between the cases and real situations is as follows:
The situation of external attacks depends on the service type of the executor. For Web, cloud, and other open applications, the number of vulnerabilities exposed in CVE libraries is vast, and it is the focus of attackers as well, resulting in a strong attack situation. While DNS and router are not the targets of most attackers, resulting in a weak attack situation. The recovery speed of executor is related to the service type and its technology of implementation. For web and cloud applications, virtualization is in common use, and the application data store in a specific database. Therefore, the operation of cleaning and data synchronization is fast. Contrarily, the router and storage system implement by the physical machine and the amount of service data is enormous. So, the speed of recovery is slow. The number of heterogeneous resources relies on the diversity of components. For mature services such as DNS, Web, and router, the software in the ecosystem is varied, so the choice of component is abundant. While in the field of cloud and distributed storage systems, the majority application is private protocols where fewer components can be chosen, so the heterogeneous resources are scarce.
The summary of comparison in Table 3 has the following characterization:
Characterization 1: In the cases of weak attack, fast recovery, and resource abundance, internal defense resources are sufficient to deal with external attacks. In such a situation, TT and TS can obtain higher security by tightening the trigger condition. While LT and LS cannot fully utilize internal resources, resulting in mediocre security performance. However, the problem is that the operation efficiency of TT is too low, which consumes a considerable overhead. While TS requires more heterogeneous executors to ensure robustness. Therefore, the four comparison methods all could not get a satisfactory result.
Characterization 2:
In the cases of strong attack, slow recovery, and resource starvation, internal defense resources are insufficient to cope with external attacks. In such a situation, the scheduling should pay more attention to the effect of every timing. Combined with the efficiency and security, the scheduling overhead of LS is only higher than that of LT, which means that LS has no more scheduling times compared with TT and TS, but it achieves a better defensive effect. In the same mode, TS does not have a satisfying performance on security. The reason is that it is in a degraded state for too long due to the improper ''tightened'' setting. While for TT and LT, they fail to hinder more targeted attacks as not exploit exception feedback, revealing the shortage of periodic scheduling.
Characterization 3: Comparing the dynamic changes of attack strength, the recovery time of executor, and heterogeneous resources, we can also find some general characteristics. First, for the type of the scheduling condition setting, TS and TT are the tight way, which is more likely to be impacted by the change of scenario variables, while LS and LT behave more stably. Secondly, from the perspective of the scheduling mode, external attack situations are more likely to impact the periodic modes LT and TT. While the exceptiontrigger mode LS and TS performs more stably under the premise that the system robustness can be guaranteed.
From the characterizations above, we know that it is extremely unwise to control the CMD scheduling sequence by fixing a period or a triggering threshold, in the face of complex and varied attack situations. Therefore, it is necessary to study scheduling methods based on variable control parameters, which is changed by time and the number of exceptions. In this regard, the SW method proposed in this paper has the following effects on the problems above:
As shown in Table 3 , for the problem in characterization 1, SW improves the operational efficiency and reduces the heterogeneous resource capacity required to ensure robustness, on the premise that the security is not lower than TT and TS. For characterization 2, SW can be on the same level as LS in terms of security, efficiency, and robustness, as it is well adapting to the harsh conditions, which is in resources starvation or strong attack. For characterization 3, when the scenario conditions change, the SW maintains a high level in each metrics, showing excellent stability. Therefore, we believe that SW can effectively solve a series of problems in CMD scheduling sequence control, which is a method worthy of further research and test.
2) SIGNIFICANCE, FEASIBILITY AND LIMITATION
At present, the literature of CMD is insufficient to consider the scheduling timing, which is a point problem in the scheduling sequence control that this paper focuses on. In terms of security, efficiency, and robustness, the existing scheduling methods have defects that will hinder the improvement of CMD theory and the application of CMD systems. In this regard, the models and methods given in this paper will attract the researchers to pay more attention in this direction. Besides, the experiment results show that the sliding window-based method we proposed has good adaptability in different attack scenarios and the state of internal resources, thus demonstrating that it is an effective solution to deal with the problems in scheduling sequence control.
The existing CMD system [9] - [17] has supported two modes of scheduling, exception triggering and periodic, which can be used as the basis of the proposed method. The additional work is to change the fixed S and T in the original monitor and trigger mechanism to variable s and t, as well implementing the corresponding calculation function. As shown in Fig.6 , the existing system has stored exception information and scheduling information in the storage module. It is only needed that records the data for each window information. The sliding window module is responsible for the calculation of s and t, which needs to implement the equation (9)-(12) for the proposed algorithm. Through the complexity analysis in §III-C, we can see that the new module will not become the time bottleneck and not bring a considerable storage overhead, so it is feasible for the application of practical scenarios.
In the paper, the model of scheduling sequence control problem is abstracted, with the theoretical research and quantitative evaluation carried out. However, this process simplifies or ignores many factors in real application systems, such as processing and network delay, the difference of performance between heterogeneous executors, the selection of scheduling targets, and specific control processes, etc. In practical applications, the processes of window sliding and scheduling control produce a delay inevitably, during which the exception feedbacks need an appropriate disposal strategy. Otherwise, it will affect the calculation in equation (9) and (11) . Additionally, the processing rates of clean, reconfiguration, reloading, and synchronization are quite different for heterogeneous executors, leading to the difference in recovery times to, which will impact on the calculation in equation (9) and (10) . Moreover, the paper considers the target of scheduling as an ideal situation to simplify the evaluations by using random strategy. However, the online time of executors is determined by the historical arbitration performance in practice [14] - [16] . Meanwhile, the CMD system will not replace all executors at once in order to ensure the continuity of services, while needs several times of scheduling for the abnormal executors. The two facts will also make the calculation need more consideration about complex factors. Besides, the experiment variables are set only according to the existing system, and it may not be possible to test and present all problems in applications. Therefore, the processing flow of the Sliding Window and the update algorithm for parameters have limitations in the evaluation of practical effects, which need to be further tested and improved in combination with the real environment.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a scheduling method based on Sliding Window is proposed to solve the inflexibility problem of the existing scheduling method in CMD.
Firstly, we give a basic model and analyze the problem for the feedback and scheduling process in the DHR structure. After that, the threat model for DHR and evaluation metrics of concern are given. Then, we introduce the sliding window mechanism in computer networks to deal with the problem in scheduling sequence control. By setting the driver events with time and exception threshold, which is the condition to trigger the window ''sliding,'' i.e., updating the scheduling control parameters, the method can adapt internal operating states and external attack situations through constant event monitoring and the adjustment of timing. Finally, we experiment with different scenarios to evaluate the necessity of research on scheduling sequence control, the effectiveness of Sliding Window, and its performance compared with existing methods. The results show that the proposed method can effectively solve a series of problems in CMD scheduling sequence control, and provides better security, efficiency, and robustness through adaptive adjustment for DHR structure in confronting complex and various internal and external situations.
In the future, we will implement Sliding Window on the metadata node of the storage system constructed with CMD, thus determining internal resource conditions. However, this will emerge with more problems in implementation and reasonableness. It is hoped that by solving these problems, we can further study the effectiveness of the algorithm and process, improving the update calculation for scheduling control parameters, the setting for window initial values, upper and lower limits, and other related values.
